Championed by the Protestant Reformers, the penal substitution model of the atonement takes its cues from the Old Testament motif of animal sacrifices for sin. In the Old Testament, the sacrifice of animals served two purposes: to cleanse the guilt of the sinner (expiation) and the appease the wrath of God (propitiation).[1] In the New Testament, Jesus’s death serves as a sacrificial offering both for the punishment of sins and to appease the wrath of God. We see both the expiation for sins and the propitiation of God in Romans 5:9. Paul writes, “Since we have now been justified by his blood, how much more shall we be saved from God’s wrath through him!” Forgiveness and reconciliation to God is possible because of Christ’s atoning work on the cross. This is good news! By faith, fallen humans can receive the gift of grace and be declared righteous before God.
There are two kinds of objections that can be raised against the penal substitution model of the atonement. Let’s begin with the charge that the penal substitution model is unintelligible and thus, unreasonable.
Objection #1: The Doctrine of the Atonement is unreasonable.
Central to the penal substitution model is the claim that there is a punishment taking place and a substitution taking place. Christ is punished for our sins. What is involved in punishment? According to the philosopher Mark Murphy, punishment requires condemnation.[2] On this view, called the expressivist theory of punishment, the harsh treatment imposed on the person being punished must express condemnation to count as punishment.[3] So far, so good. But now the problem: condemnation, and thus punishment, is non-transferrable. As Murphy writes, “one cannot express condemnation via hard treatment of someone who one does not take to be worthy of condemnation.”[4] Christ, as morally perfect, is not worthy of condemnation. Thus, God can neither condemn nor punish Christ for our sins. This result is embarring, to say the least, since penal substitution and a plausible theory of punishment (i.e., expressivism) entails that Christ is and is not punished for our sins. This, of course, is incoherent. Penal substitution is unreasonable because incoherent.
Fortunately for the defender in penal substitution there are number of possible replies to the incoherency objection. Either the expressivist theory of punishment is true, or it isn’t. Assume that it is true. Then the defender of penal substitution has three possible replies. First, it is possible to endorse the view that Christ was not punished for our sins but rather endured the suffering that would have been our punishment had we been punished.[5] On this view, Christ is not actually punished, rather he pays the penal consequence for our sins. In paying the penalty due for sins, the demands of divine justice are satisfied. When we repent and place our faith in Christ’s saving work, we are no longer deserving of punishment. Second, even if Christ is punished for our sins, it could be argued that the condemnation required for punishment need not be directed at Christ. Rather, the condemnation involved in punishing Christ could be directed toward the person(s) who did the acts (i.e., human sinners) or the acts themselves (i.e., human sins). Finally, even if Christ is punished for our sins and condemnation must be directed at Christ, if the doctrine of the imputation of sin is adopted, it is possible to hold Christ legally guilty, and thus justly condemned by God for our sins. According to the doctrine of the imputation of sin, while Christ is morally without fault, he takes on the guilt of human sins and thus is deserving of punishment. Finally, assume that the expressivist theory of punishment is false. If so, then the defender of penal substitution is free to endorse a theory of punishment that does not include condemnation as a necessary condition for punishment. But then there is no obstacle, as far as I can see, to the coherence, and hence reasonableness, of the penal substitutionary model of the atonement. While there are other conceptual objections to penal substitution, the most pressing objections involve the idea that the doctrine is immoral in some way.[6] It is to this family of objections I now turn.
Objection #2: The Doctrine of the Atonement is undesirable.
There are at least two powerful objections often raised against the desirability of the penal substitution model of the atonement. The first objection, called the problem of divine violence, claims that the violence central to the penal substitution model is immoral and thus unbecoming of a perfectly good God. For example, the atheist Richard Dawkins describes the Christian doctrine of the atonement as “vicious, sado-masochistic and repellent.”[7] And feminist theologians think that God’s demand that Christ suffer and die, in glorifying suffering, amounts to a kind of “divine child abuse.”[8]
Why think the penal substitution model is a kind of divine child abuse? In human cases of child abuse, the adult inflicts harm on a child and does so against the will of the child. But things are different in the divine case, for at least two reasons. First, given the Triune nature of God, there is an important sense in which means of atonement is all God. Christ’s suffering is not a case of one being inflicting harm on another (distinct) being. Rather, God himself (in a meaningful sense) experiences death on the cross. Second, it is important to remember that Jesus volunteers to die. The harm intended on Christ is not inflicted against Christ’s will. Rather, the Father and Son (and Holy Spirit) are agreed: The triune God’s plan is to reconcile fallen humans by sending the Son to die as punishment for sin.[9] The charge of divine child abuse doesn’t stick.
This reply to the charge of divine child abuse doesn’t solve the problem of divine violence, however. Recall, on the penal substitution model, Christ is harmed, even if not against his will. This seems morally problematic. To see why, consider, plausibly violence includes the intent to harm another.[10] Suppose I push my son off the road, inflicting great harm on him. I’m not acting violently towards him if my intent in pushing him off the road is to prevent him from being harmed, say by being hit by an oncoming car (even if in pushing him off the road he was harmed). However, if I pushed my son off the road because I desire to harm him, this act, being a violent act, is morally unjust and evil. In the divine case, God the Father sent his Son to suffer and die. It seems that God the Father intends to inflict harm on Christ. If so, then this act is also morally unjust and evil, unbecoming of a perfectly good God. In reply, it could be argued that God the Father does not intend Christ harm when sending him to suffer and die on behalf of humans.[11] Rather, God the Father sends the Son intending to heal fallen humans, not to harm Christ. Since expiation for sin and propitiation of God’s wrath are a necessary requirement for reconciliation, God knows, and thus foresees that in sending his Son, the Jewish leaders and Roman soldiers will act violently towards Christ. God permits this situation (and/or even ordains it), without intending Christ harm. It is possible to argue that God the Father does not act violently toward Christ even though he requires Christ be punished (or endure punishment) for sins.
The second objection, called the problem of punishing an innocent person, claims that it is unjust to punish someone else in the place of a wrongdoer.[12] Recall our earlier discussion. Either Christ is or is not punished for our sins. If he is not punished for our sins, then the objection dissolves. Christ endures what would be our punishment, thereby satisfying the demands of divine justice. This reply only works if God’s essential justice does not include retributive justice. However, there are good biblical reasons for thinking that God’s essential justice does include retributive justice.[13] But then, since guilt deserves punishment, and since Christ volunteers to be punished in our place, and since Christ is without sin, the problem of punishing an innocent person resurfaces again.
The Reformers opted for a different response to the problem of punishing an innocent person. Taking their cue from passages such as 2 Corinthians 5:21, which reads “God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God,” the Reformers argued that our sin was imputed to Christ. According to the doctrine of the imputation of sin, as noted above, Christ is legally guilty for sin, even though he himself has committed no sin. But if Christ is legally guilty for sin, then he is not an innocent person and there is no injustice in punishing Christ for sins.
The main problem with this view concerns the idea of transferring sin, guilt, and punishment to another person. When we think about such things, we are of two minds concerning the idea of transferring guilt, sin, and punishment to another.[14] On the one hand, in the case of murder, we don’t think it possible to transfer punishment to another person to satisfy the demands of justice. On the other hand, in the case of fines imposed on a wrongdoer, we typically do think it possible to transfer punishment to another (i.e., for someone else to pay the fines on behalf of the wrongdoer). But then, it seems we do think it possible, in some cases at least, to transfer punishment, and perhaps guilt and sin, to another. In fact, there is precedent in our legal system, given the doctrine of vicarious liability, to transfer guilt to another. For example, if an employee commits a crime, often the employer is held guilty, even if he didn’t do anything wrong. It could be argued reasonably then that given God’s role as lawgiver and just judge, there is no reason to think he could not exercise his divine prerogative and transfer the guilt of human sin to Christ.[15] The upshot is that there are several plausible replies to our second objection to the desirability of the penal substitution model of the atonement.
Conclusion
I’ve argued that the penal substitution model of the atonement is biblically warranted and philosophically defensible. The Protestant Reformers were justified in considering penal substitution the heart of atonement, for it provides a mechanism that explains how fallen humans can transition to a state of grace in Christ. In God’s great act of sending his Son as a sacrifice for sin, the perfect justice and love of God is on full display. The Christian story, of all the competing stories, is not just the greatest story, it is the greatest possible story since it includes incarnation and atonement. [16] Penal substitution is both reasonable and desirable.
Notes:
[1] Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 18.
[2] Mark C. Murphy, “Not Penal Substitution But Vicarious Punishment,” Faith and Philosophy 26.3 (2009): 256. The four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for punishment are that the punishment is harsh, meted out by a proper authority, for a wrongdoing, and expressive of condemnation [Ibid., 255–256].
[3] Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 151.
[4] Murphy, “Not Penal Substitution But Vicarious Punishment,” 256. Just as the honor due an athlete for winning a race cannot be transferred to another, the condemnation due a wrongdoer cannot be transferred to another.
[5] All the possible replies to the incoherency worry discussed in this paragraph are from Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 150–162. Craig discusses each reply in detail.
[6] For a conceptual challenge to the reasonableness of penal substitution theory that focuses on divine love and forgiveness, see Eleonore Stump, Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 79–83. For a reply to Stump, see Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 162–172.
[7] Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 287.
[8] Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, “For God So Loved the World?”, in Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique, eds., Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1989), 26.
[9] Crisp, Approaching the Atonement, 101–102, 137.
[10] Ibid., 139.
[11] This reply is called the double effect response to atoning violence by Crisp in Ibid., 140–144.
[12] The following two paragraphs summarizes some of the main worries and moves related to punishing an innocent as discussed in detail by William Lane Craig in his Atonement and the Death of Christ, 173–193.
[13] See e.g., Exodus 34:7; Romans 1:32, 11:9, and 12:19; Hebrews 10:29.
[14] David Lewis, “Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?” Philosophical Papers 26.3 (1997): 207.
[15] Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 183.
[16] Alvin Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa’,” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 1–25.